This page was exported from IT certification exam materials [ http://blog.dumpleader.com ] Export date:Sat Feb 22 7:52:04 2025 / +0000 GMT ___________________________________________________ Title: The Ultimate ACAMS CAMS-FCI Dumps PDF Review [Q22-Q44] --------------------------------------------------- The Ultimate ACAMS CAMS-FCI Dumps PDF Review Achieve The Utmost Performance In CAMS-FCI Exam Pass Guaranteed NEW QUESTION 22An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance.KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank in 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.* X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer;* Y is the authorized signatory of this entity customer. This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.KYC PROFILECustomer Name: AAA International Company. LtdCustomer ID: 123456Account Opened: June 2017Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017 AML risk level: High Account opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans and Trade Finance Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amount During the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:TRANSACTION JOURNALReview dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from different third parties Outgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to different third parties For United States Dollars (USD) currency:Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from different third parties Outgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to different third parties.RFI Information and Supporting documents:According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank with the information below:1) All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank.Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank’s customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay the loan Based on the KYC profile and the transaction journal, the pattern of activity shows a deviation in:  expected vs. actual activity.  customer risk rating  product risk rating.  U.S. currency incoming vs. outgoing transaction rales. ExplanationThe correct answer is A because the expected account activities were 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amount, but the actual activity showed much more frequent and varied transactions in different currencies and amounts. This indicates a deviation from the customer’s profile and risk level.References: Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide, page 16NEW QUESTION 23An AML investigator at a bank identifies an unusually high number of deposits from a few customers resulting from the encashment of multiple gambling tickets from a legitimate gambling company. It is noted that the transactions are inconsistent with the customers’ profiles and that reverse (corrective) transactions did not occur. Which suspicious activity is most likely?  The winning tickets are traded to criminals who. in turn, use the customers’ accounts.  The gambling company created fictitious transactions in an attempt to misrepresent the size of its business activity.  The customers are attempting to evade income tax.  The customers deposited fake winning tickets. ExplanationThe correct answer is A because this scenario describes a possible case of ticket laundering, which is a form of money laundering where criminals use gambling tickets to disguise the source of their illicit funds. The customers who deposit the tickets are either complicit or unaware of the scheme, and they receive a commission or a fee for their service. The other options are not likely because they do not explain why the customers would deposit multiple tickets from the same gambling company and withdraw cash the next day.References: : Ticket Laundering: A Money Laundering MethodNEW QUESTION 24Which reputations risk consequence could a financial entity face for violating AML laws?  Loss of high-profile customers  Increased audit costs to monitor behavior  Seizure of assets  Monetary penalties NEW QUESTION 25Potentially suspicious activity following an increase in the volume of transactions by an import company included outgoing wires to Indonesia and Uganda referencing invoice numbers. Incoming funds included large cash deposits and checks/wires from pet stores, breeders, and private individuals. What financial crime might the bank reference in the SAR/STR?  Tax evasion scheme  International drug trafficking  Illegal wildlife trade  Black market peso exchange ExplanationThe best reason the EU bank should file a SAR/STR is that the events raise concerns that the payment represents proceeds from illegal wildlife trade, which is a serious financial crime and a predicate offense for money laundering in many jurisdictions3. The fact that the incoming funds came from pet stores, breeders, and private individuals suggests that the import company may be involved in smuggling or trafficking endangered or protected animals or their parts4. The outgoing wires to Indonesia and Uganda, which are known source countries for wildlife trafficking, may indicate payments to suppliers or facilitators of this illicit activity.References: 3: Financial Action Task Force Report on Money Laundering from the Illegal Wildlife Trade, page 9 4: Financial Crime Typologies – Intermediate, page 18 : [World Wildlife Crime Report], page 16NEW QUESTION 26A compliance analyst is reviewing the account activity of a customer that they suspect may be indicative of money laundering activity. Which is difficult to determine solely from the customer’s account activity and KYC file?  If the activity is materially different from related businesses  If the account has multiple transfers to the same, related businesses  If there is negative media associated with counterparties  If the account is mostly dormant or has little activity ExplanationAccording to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) study guide, 6th edition, page 105, the correct answer is C. It can be difficult to determine if there is negative media associated with counterparties solely from the customer’s account activity and KYC file.The study guide explains that negative media can include news articles, government sanctions lists, and other sources of public information that may indicate that a counterparty is involved in illicit activities. However, this information may not be readily available in a customer’s account activity or KYC file, and may require additional research or investigation.NEW QUESTION 27During a review, an analyst notices discrepancies between a customer’s nature of business listed on the business registry and what was stated on the customers application. The analyst should:  clarify discrepancies noted in the customer’s declared profile given the downstream impact on the risk assessment.  close the review as there is no adverse news in the public domain.  review all documents for whether certified true copies are submitted.  accept discrepancies in the information given the onboarding team did not flag any issue. ExplanationThe analyst should clarify discrepancies noted in the customer’s declared profile given the downstream impact on the risk assessment. This is because discrepancies between the customer’s nature of business and the information on the business registry may indicate that the customer is not operating a legitimate business or is trying to conceal its true activities. The analyst should verify the customer’s identity, source of funds, and purpose of transactions to ensure that the customer’s risk profile is accurate and consistent with the Fl’s risk appetite.References: Leading Complex Investigations Certificate, Module 2, page 9.NEW QUESTION 28An investigator receives an alert documenting a series of transactions. A limited liability corporation (LLC) wired 59.000.000 USD to an overseas account associated with a state-run oil company. A second account associated with the state-run oil company wired 600,000,000 USD to the LLC. The LLC then wired money to other accounts, a money brokerage firm, and real estate purchases.The investigator initiated an enhanced KYC investigation on the LLC. The financial institution opened the LLC account a couple weeks prior to the series of transactions. The names associated with the LLC had changed multiple times since the account opened. A search of those names revealed relations with multiple LLCs. Public records about the LLCs did not show any identifiable business activities.Open-source research identified mixed reports about the brokerage firm. The firm indicated it purchased mutual funds for its clients and dispensed returns to clients. Media reports claimed the firm laundered money by holding money for a fee before returning it to investors.What is the total suspicious transaction amount that the investigator should report?  600,000,000 USD  59,000,000 USD  541.000,000 USD  659,000,000 USD ExplanationThe total suspicious transaction amount that the investigator should report is 659,000,000 USD. This is the sum of the two transactions involving the LLC and the state-run oil company, which are 59,000,000 USD and600,000,000 USD respectively. The other transactions that the LLC made to other accounts, a money brokerage firm, and real estate purchases are not relevant to the question, as they are not part of the series of transactions that triggered the alert.References: Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification | ACAMSNEW QUESTION 29Which might suggest misuse of crowdfunding resources by a terrorist?  A small charge at a gas station followed by a large charge at an electronics store  A large deposit followed by multiple charges at a sporting goods store  Multiple small deposits followed by a wire transfer to a large well-known international charity  Multiple small deposits followed by the purchase of airplane tickets > ExplanationThe purchase of airplane tickets after receiving multiple small deposits from a crowdfunding platform might suggest that the funds are being used to facilitate travel for terrorist purposes. The other options are not necessarily indicative of terrorist financing, as they could be explained by legitimate reasons or other types of financial crimes.NEW QUESTION 30An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance.KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank in 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.* X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer;* Y is the authorized signatory of this entity customer. This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.KYC PROFILECustomer Name: AAA International Company. LtdCustomer ID: 123456Account Opened: June 2017Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017 AML risk level: High Account opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans, and Trade Finance Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amount During the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:TRANSACTION JOURNALReview dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from different third parties Outgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to different third parties For United States Dollars (USD) currency:Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from different third parties Outgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to different third parties.RFI Information and Supporting documents:According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank with the information below:1J All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank.Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank’s customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay the loan Which additional information would support escalating this account for closure?  The bank files SARs/STRs indicating that Y opened accounts for small companies located in close proximity to the bank.  A follow-up request reveals that the account receives funds from loans, collects payments from group-related companies, and sends the payments to the lenders.  A review of outward remittances reveals the same pattern of several simple steps for each transaction,  A review of X’s personal bank account shows that X received wire transfers that aggregate the amounts transferred to the group-related companies. ExplanationA review of outward remittances reveals the same pattern of several simple steps for each transaction, which could indicate a layering scheme to obscure the origin and destination of the funds. This would support escalating this account for closure, as it is inconsistent with the customer’s declared purpose and anticipated activities. The other options are not relevant or sufficient to warrant account closure.References: Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification | ACAMSNEW QUESTION 31Law enforcement (LE) suspects human trafficking to occur during a major sporting event LE officers asked several financial institutions (FIs) to monitor financial transactions occurring before, during, and after the event.An investigator identified a pattern linked to a business. The business’ account received multiple even dollar deposits between midnight and 4:00 AM. They occurred each day for several days prior to the date of the sporting event. Also, large cash deposits, typically between 2,000 USD and 3,000 USD. made by a person to the business’ account occurred in many branches in the days after the sports event.There was little information about the company. The company did not have any history of employee payroll expenses or paying taxes. Expenses from the business account included air travel and hotel expenses. Searches about the person making cash deposits showed little. An online social media platform webpage with the individual’s name showed ads for dates1′ and “companionship.” The Fl wants to create an automated alert for human trafficking money laundering after this investigation.Which activity type should they target?  Payments made to multiple hotels in the same city  Multiple deposits between midnight and 4:00 AM  Deposits made within days of major sporting events  Payments made for virtual currency ExplanationThe activity type that the FI should target for creating an automated alert for human trafficking money laundering is multiple deposits between midnight and 4:00 AM (B). This is because this pattern is consistent with the indicators of human trafficking identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Egmont Group1, which include:Frequent cash deposits, often in round amounts, outside of normal business hours Deposits made at different branches or ATMs in various locations Lack of information about the nature and purpose of the business Involvement in online platforms that advertise sexual services Expenses related to travel and accommodation The other options are not as relevant or specific as option B. Payments made to multiple hotels in the same city (A) could be a legitimate business expense or a sign of other types of money laundering, such as tax evasion or fraud. Deposits made within days of major sporting events could also be explained by other factors, such as increased tourism or gambling. Payments made for virtual currency (D) are not directly related to human trafficking, although they could be used to facilitate money laundering in general.References: 1: FATF and Egmont Group, Financial Flows from Human Trafficking, July 2018, available at FATFNEW QUESTION 32A U.S. financial institution (Fl) receives a grand jury subpoena for a corporate client’s account. The Fl should:  request the client’s consent for the disclosure of account information.  review the corporate account’s activity and transactions.  file a SAR/STR.  provide the client with a copy of the subpoena. ExplanationThe Fl should review the corporate account’s activity and transactions. This is because a grand jury subpoena is a legal request for information or testimony that may be used in a criminal investigation or prosecution. The Fl should review the account for any suspicious or unusual activity that may be related to the subpoena or indicate money laundering, terrorist financing, or other financial crimes. The Fl should also document its review and retain any relevant records.References: Leading Complex Investigations Certificate, Module 3, page 14.NEW QUESTION 33An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance.KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank since 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.* X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer;* Y is is the authorized signatory of this entity customer. This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.KYC PROFILECustomer Name: AAA International Company. LtdCustomer ID: 123456Account Opened: June 2017Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017 AML risk level: High Account opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans and Trade Finance Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amount During the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:TRANSACTION JOURNALReview dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from different third parties Outgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to different third parties For United States Dollars (USD) currency:Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from different third parties Outgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to different third parties.RFI Information and Supporting documents:According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank with the information below:1) All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank.Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank’s customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay the loan After reviewing the transaction journal, request for information response, and supporting documentation, the investigator determines that additional information is needed. Which additional information should the investigator request?  Previously filed SARVSTR unrelated to the customer, but similar in content  Formation document/description of the group-related companies  Source of the incoming funds to the group-related companies  Adverse news screening on all names listed in the formation documents ExplanationThe additional information that the investigator should request is the source of the incoming funds to the group-related companies. This is because the customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies, but the transaction journal shows that the customer received funds from different third parties, not from group-related companies. Therefore, the investigator should verify the relationship and legitimacy of these third parties and their funds with the customer and the group-related companies. The other options are not relevant or necessary for this investigation.References: Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification | ACAMSNEW QUESTION 34Which action is part of the enhanced due diligence process?  Collecting beneficial ownership details regarding the client’s account  Using standard monitoring procedures to monitor transactions and account activity  Verifying the source of wealth for entities and natural person clients  Applying higher ownership percentage requirement for beneficial ownership collection ExplanationOne of the actions that is part of the enhanced due diligence process is collecting beneficial ownership details regarding the client’s account. This is important to identify the natural persons who ultimately own or control the client, and to assess the potential risks associated with them. According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), beneficial ownership information should include1:The name, nationality, and country of residence of each beneficial owner.The date of birth or incorporation of each beneficial owner.The nature and extent of the beneficial interest held by each beneficial owner.The means by which the beneficial ownership or control is exercised.References:FATF Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial OwnershipNEW QUESTION 35During transaction monitoring. Bank A learns that one of its customers. Med Supplies 123, is attempting to make a payment via wire totaling 382.500 USD to PPE Business LLC located in Mexico to purchase a large order of personal protective equipment. specifically surgical masks and face shields. Upon further verification.Bank A decides to escalate and refers the case to investigators.Bank A notes that days prior to the above transaction, the same customer went to a Bank A location to wire1,215,280 USD to Breath Well LTD located in Singapore. Breath Well was acting as an intermediary to purchase both 3-ply surgical masks and face shields from China. Bank A decided not to complete the transaction due to concerns with the involved supplier in China. Moreover, the customer is attempting to send a third wire in the amount of 350,000 USD for the purchase of these items, this time using a different vendor in China. The investigator must determine the next steps in the investigation and what actions, if any. should be taken against relevant parties.The investigator is gathering more information to determine if a SAR/STR filing is needed. Which steps are the correct ways of collecting the additional information? (Select Two.)  Reach out to the relationship manager asking if more up-to-date customer due diligence information can be collected on the customer.  Use available documentation received from law enforcement (e.g.. grand jury subpoena) as red flags in SAR/STR filing.  Reach out to the customer and ask for supporting documentation for the conducted wires to avoid SAR/STR filing.  Conduct open-source research to determine if the customer and involved counterparties are in the same business field.  Issue a USA PATRIOT ACT Section 314(b) request to participating financial institutions advising that information is needed to decide if the activity is suspicious. ExplanationThe correct answer is A and C because these indicators suggest that the customer is using fraudulent documents and misrepresenting the goods to conceal the illicit nature of the transactions. Fentanyl traffickers often use front companies and falsified invoices to disguise their shipments as legitimate products, such as medical supplies or chemicals. Reviewing the invoices and transportation documents, as well as the FDA product certifications, can help to identify discrepancies or anomalies that indicate fraud or deception.References: Fentanyl and Fentanyl Analogues: Federal Trends and Trafficking Patterns, page 18; Fentanyl Trafficking Offenses, page 2.NEW QUESTION 36A financial institution (Fl) banks a money transmitter business (MTB) located in Miami. The MTB regularly initiates wire transfers with the ultimate beneficiary in Cuba and legally sells travel packages to Cuba. The wire transfers for money remittances comply with the country’s economic sanctions policies. A Fl investigator on the sanctions team reviews each wire transfer to ensure compliance with sanctions and to monitor transfer details.An airline located in Cuba, unrelated to the business, legally sells airline tickets in Cuba to Cuban citizens wanting to travel outside of Cuba. The airline tickets are purchased using Cuban currency (CUC).The MTB wants 100,000 USD worth of CUC. Purchasing CUC from a Cuban bank includes a 4% fee. The MTB contacts the airline to ask if the airline will trade its CUC for USD at a lower exchange fee than the Cuban bank. The airline agrees to a 1% fee. The MTB initiates a wire transfer to the airline which appears as normal activity in the monitoring system because of the business’ travel package sales.Which investigative actions should the investigator take concerning the 100.000 USD wire transfer? (Select Three.)  Review the wire transfer protocols for this customer.  Gather all account activity for Fl clients that purchased packages from the airline.  Review a sampling of wire transfers initiated by travel companies with Cuba travel packages.  Recommend a plan for the Fl’s management to restrict the account relationship.  Review regulations applicable to foreign currency trading transactions.  Locate and review licenses, registrations, and account operating agreements associated with the MTB account. ExplanationThe investigator should take the following investigative actions concerning the 100,000 USD wire transfer:Review the wire transfer protocols for this customer. This will help the investigator to determine if the wire transfer is consistent with the customer’s normal business activity and risk profile, or if it deviates from the established patterns or thresholds.Review regulations applicable to foreign currency trading transactions. This will help the investigator to assess if the wire transfer violates any laws or regulations related to currency exchange, such as reporting requirements, licensing requirements, or sanctions compliance.Locate and review licenses, registrations, and account operating agreements associated with the MTB account. This will help the investigator to verify if the MTB has the necessary authorization and documentation to conduct currency exchange transactions and if it has disclosed this activity to the FI.References: Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide, pages 32-33.NEW QUESTION 37The investigative department of a financial institution (Fl) receives an internal escalation notice from the remittance department for a SWIFT message requesting a refund due to potential fraud. The notice indicates that a total of three international incoming remittances were transferred to a corporate customer from Country A, in the amount of approximately 5 million EUR for each. The first two incoming remittances had been exchanged into currency B and transferred out to Country B a few days ago. The third incoming remittance has been held by the remittance department.As noted from the KYC profile, the corporate customer is working in the wood industry. with the last account review completed 3 months ago. Since the account’s opening. there has been no history of a large amount of funds flowing through the account. The investigator conducts an Internet search and finds that the remitter is a food beverage company.The same morning, the investigator receives a call from a financial intelligence unit (FIU) inquiring about the same incident. The FIU states that it will issue a warrant to freeze the account on the same day.Which steps for documenting the final investigation decision are appropriate for the investigator in this scenario?  Exclude any open-source information from record-keeping since it is publicly available.  Add all of the information the Fl has about the subject, their account(s) activity, research results. KYC information, etc. to the SAR/STR.  Document the investigation process and retain all relevant documents in the case management system.  Do not document the investigation process if a SAR/STR is not filed. ExplanationThe investigator should document the investigation process and retain all relevant documents in the case management system. This is because documenting the investigation process is a good practice to ensure the quality and consistency of the investigation, as well as to facilitate the review and audit of the investigation.Retaining all relevant documents is also important to support the evidence and findings of the investigation, as well as to comply with the record-keeping requirements of the relevant authorities. The other options are incorrect because:A: Excluding any open-source information from record-keeping is not advisable, as open-source information can provide valuable insights and context for the investigation, and may not be easily retrievable in the future.B: Adding all of the information the FI has about the subject, their account(s) activity, research results, KYC information, etc. to the SAR/STR is not necessary, as the SAR/STR should only contain the essential information that is relevant and material to the suspicious activity. Adding too much information may obscure the main points and make the SAR/STR less effective.D; Not documenting the investigation process if a SAR/STR is not filed is not acceptable, as the investigation process should be documented regardless of the outcome. Documenting the investigation process can help justify why a SAR/STR was not filed, and also provide a reference for future investigations involving the same subject or activity.R:ferences:Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification | ACAMS, Section 3: Reporting Suspicious Activity, page 14 Leading Complex Investigations Certificate | ACAMS, Module 4: Documenting Your Investigation, page 4NEW QUESTION 38The investigative department of a financial institution (Fl) receives an internal escalation notice from the remittance department for a SWIFT message requesting a refund due to potential fraud. The notice indicates that a total of three international incoming remittances were transferred to a corporate customer from Country A, in the amount of approximately 5 million EUR for each. The first two incoming remittances had been exchanged into currency B and transferred out to Country B a few days ago. The third incoming remittance has been held by the remittance department.As noted from the KYC profile, the corporate customer is working in the wood industry. with the last account review completed 3 months ago. Since the account’s opening. there has been no history of a large amount of funds flowing through the account. The investigator conducts an Internet search and finds that the remitter is a food beverage company.The same morning, the investigator receives a call from a financial intelligence unit (FIU) inquiring about the same incident. The FIU states that it will issue a warrant to freeze the account on the same day.After further review, the decision is made that transactions appear suspicious. Which are the next steps the investigator should take? (Select Two.)  Close the customer’s accounts since the FIU is issuing a warrant to freeze the funds.  Contact local LE and advise them of the investigation details to help speed up the investigation and prosecution.  Provide additional information to the LE upon receiving a formal request.  Close the investigation as the FIU is already on this matter, and they will inform LE if needed.  Gather all the information that would be useful for law enforcement (LE) and recommend filing a SAR/STR ExplanationThe correct answer is C and E.The investigator should provide additional information to the LE upon receiving a formal request, and gather all the information that would be useful for LE and recommend filing a SAR/STR. These steps are consistent with the best practices of conducting financial crime investigations and reporting suspicious activity. The investigator should not close the customer’s accounts or the investigation, as this may interfere with the ongoing LE inquiry and violate the FI’s policies and procedures. The investigator should also not contact local LE directly, as this may compromise the confidentiality of the investigation and the FIU’s authority. References:Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide, Chapter 4: Reporting Suspicious Activity, pages 40-411 Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide, Chapter 5: Governance of an AFC Investigations Unit, pages48-491Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification | ACAMSNEW QUESTION 39SAR/STR NARRATIVEA SAR/STR has been submitted on five transactions conducted on the correspondent banking relationship with ABC Bank.Client Information:Remitter information: DEF Oil Resource Ltd. is the oldest member of the DEF Group. It was founded in 1977 as a general trading business with a primary focus on exports from Africa and North America. The group has business activities that span the entire energy value chain. Their core field of endeavor is centered within the oil and gas industry and its associated sub-sectors.Beneficiary Information:As per the response received from ABC Bank, it was determined that the beneficiaries are related to DEF Oil Resource Ltd. These were created by DEF Oil Resource Ltd. to purchase property in a foreign country on behalf of their senior management as part of a bonus scheme. The purpose behind this payment was for purchase of property in another country.Payment Reference:ABCXXXXX31PZFG2HABCXXXXXX51PQGEHABCXXXXXX214QWVGABCXXXXXX41PSXA2ABCXXXXXX815QWS3Concerns:* We are unsure about the country of incorporation of the beneficiaries.* We are concerned about the transactional activity since the payment made towards entities (conducted on behalf of individuals) appears to be possible tax evasion.* There appears to be an attempt to conceal the identity of individuals (senior management), which again raises concerns about the source of funds.* Referring to the response received from ABC Bank, we are unclear about the ultimate beneficiary of funds.* The remitter is involved in a high-risk business, (i.e., oil and crude products trading), and the beneficiary is involved in a real estate business which again poses a higher risk.The monitoring system of the correspondent institution flags the transaction as suspicious activity. The correspondent bank needs to send a request for information to the respondent bank. Which elements should be included in the request? (Select Three.)  Details of DEF Oil Resource Ltd parent company and the name(s) of the beneficial owner(s)  Full transaction history of the correspondent bank’s customer  The account profile of the customer and their KYC data  The respondent bank’s customer’s senior management bonus plan  The contract pertaining to the purchase of property in another country  The last 6 months of transactional history ExplanationThe request for information should include the following elements:Details of DEF Oil Resource Ltd parent company and the name(s) of the beneficial owner(s) (Option A): This is necessary to verify the identity and ownership structure of the remitter and to assess the risk level of the customer and the transaction.The account profile of the customer and their KYC data (Option C): This is necessary to understand the nature and purpose of the customer’s business relationship with the respondent bank and to compare it with the observed transactional activity.The contract pertaining to the purchase of property in another country (Option E): This is necessary to verify the legitimacy and source of funds for the transaction and to identify the ultimate beneficiary of funds.The other options are not relevant or necessary for the request for information. The full transaction history of the correspondent bank’s customer (Option B) is too broad and may not be related to suspicious activity. The respondent bank’s customer’s senior management bonus plan (Option D) is not relevant to the transaction and may not be available to the respondent bank. The last 6 months of transactional history (Option F) is also too broad and may not be related to the suspicious activity.References:Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification Handbook, page 19NEW QUESTION 40A financial institution <FI> might use which option as intelligence to file a SAR/STR?  A customer makes several deposits in one month that appear to exceed their expected monthly income.  A customer receives a large, one-time wire from a law firm.  The Fl is unable to obtain evidence of required licensing or registration despite suspicion of money transmitting.  The Fl discovers a large number of securities transactions that appear to be related to day trading. ExplanationThe correct answer is C because the FI is unable to obtain evidence of required licensing or registration despite suspicion of money transmitting, which is a red flag for money laundering and a violation of federal and state laws. Option A is incorrect because making several deposits in one month that appear to exceed their expected monthly income might not be indicative of suspicious activity, depending on the customer’s profile and source of funds. Option B is incorrect because receiving a large, one-time wire from a law firm might not be indicative of suspicious activity, depending on the customer’s relationship with the law firm and the purpose of the wire. Option D is incorrect because discovering a large number of securities transactions that appear to be related to day trading might not be indicative of suspicious activity, depending on the customer’s investment strategy and risk tolerance.References: Money transmitter – Wikipedia; The Quick Guide To Money Transmitter Licenses – Surety Bond Insider; Financial Crime Typologies – Intermediate Certificate, Module 3.NEW QUESTION 41Sanctions screening requirements include that a financial institution should:  report an individual whose name appears on a sanctions list to the police.  immediately freeze the bank account of an individual that appears on a sanctions list.  compare customer and transaction records against periodically updated sanctions lists provided by governmental bodies.  immediately close the bank account of an entity who appears on a sanctions list. ExplanationCompare customer and transaction records against periodically updated sanctions lists provided by governmental bodies. This is stated in the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) manual on page 595, which states: “Sanctions screening requirements include that a financial institution should compare customer and transaction records against periodically updated sanctions lists provided by governmental bodies.”NEW QUESTION 42A financial institution (Fl) has considered the available relevant factors in a transaction and has determined it will file a SAR^STR. Which is needed to support the contents of the report to the financial intelligence unit?  Definitive proof that suspicious activity occurred  Enough circumstantial evidence about the suspicious activity for a criminal proceeding  No factual description of the suspicious activity  Low evidentiary threshold about the suspicious activity ExplanationA SAR/STR does not require definitive proof or enough circumstantial evidence of suspicious activity, as these are high evidentiary thresholds that may be difficult or impossible to obtain by the FI. A SAR/STR should include a factual description of the suspicious activity, as this is essential for the FIU to analyze and disseminate the information. A low evidentiary threshold means that the FI has reasonable grounds to suspect that the activity is related to money laundering, terrorism financing, or other financial crimes, based on the available relevant factors. This is the main criterion for filing a SAR/STR.References: Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification | ACAMS, Suspicious activity report – Wikipedia, Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) / Suspicious Activity Report (SAR …NEW QUESTION 43An investigator is reviewing an alert for unusual activity. System scanning detected a text string within a company customer’s account transactions that indicates the account may have been used for a drug or drug paraphernalia purchase Based on the KYC profile, the investigator determines the customer’s company name and business type are marketed as a gardening supplies company. The investigator reviews the account activity and notes an online purchase transaction that leads the investigator to a website that sells various strains of marijuana. Additional account review detects cash deposits into the account at the branch teller lines, so the investigator reaches out to the teller staff regarding the transactions. The teller staff member reports that the business customers have frequently deposited cash in lower amounts. The teller, without prompting, adds that one of the transactors would occasionally smell of a distinct scent of marijuana smoke.Which are the best next steps for the investigator to take? (Select Three.)  Review the customer’s transaction history.  Request information from the internet service provider who hosts the website.  Check internal KYC information.  Research other customer accounts for transactions to the same website.E Conduct adverse media and open-source searches on the customer’s background.  Identify if the customer has opened accounts in an urban city area. ExplanationThe best next steps for the investigator to take are:A: Review the customer’s transaction history. This can help the investigator identify any patterns or anomalies in the customer’s account activity, such as changes in transaction volume, frequency, amount, source, destination, purpose, etc. The investigator can also compare the customer’s transaction history with their KYC profile and risk rating to assess if there are any discrepancies or inconsistencies.C: Check internal KYC information. This can help the investigator verify the customer’s identity, business nature, ownership structure, expected activity, source of funds, etc. The investigator can also update or enhance the customer’s KYC information based on any new or relevant information obtained from other sources.E:Conduct adverse media and open-source searches on the customer’s background. This can help the investigator find out if there is any negative or adverse information about the customer in public data sources, such as news articles, social media posts, blogs, forums, etc. Adverse media and open-source searches can also provide additional context and insight into the customer’s reputation, behavior, associations, etc. The other options are incorrect because:B: Request information from the internet service provider who hosts the website is not feasible, as it may require a legal process or a court order to obtain such information. Moreover, the internet service provider may not have or disclose any useful information about the website or its owner.D: Research other customer accounts for transactions to the same website is not relevant, as it may not provide any meaningful information about the customer under investigation. Furthermore, it may violate the privacy and confidentiality of other customers who are not related to the investigation.F: Identify if the customer has opened accounts in an urban city area is not helpful, as it may not have any bearing on the customer’s involvement in a drug or drug paraphernalia purchase. Additionally, it may not be possible to access or verify such information without the customer’s consent or authorization.References:Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification | ACAMS, Section 2: Investigating Financial Crimes, page 11 Leading Complex Investigations Certificate | ACAMS, Module 3: Conducting Research and Analysis, page 6 Adverse Media Screening – Using AI to Mitigate Risk Legal requirements for adverse media screening – Thomson Reuters Electronic client due diligence | Ethics helpsheets | ICAEW6AMLD & FATF: Where Adverse Media Screening Fits InFree Adverse Media Check | NameScanNEW QUESTION 44A SAR/STR regarding money-mule activity prompts law enforcement action. Under U.S. law, the alleged money mules can be prosecuted:  only if they were aware of their role and actively participated.  in a country only if funds were transferred between accounts maintained in the same country.  unless they can prove they were not aware of the origin of the funds.  even if they were unaware that money was transferred. ExplanationAccording to U.S. law, money mules can be prosecuted even if they were unaware that money was transferred, as long as they acted with reckless disregard of the source of the funds or the purpose of the transaction1.This is because money mules are considered to be aiding and abetting money laundering, which does not require proof of specific intent2.References: 1: Money Mule Awareness Booklet, page 8 2: Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. ยง 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law, page 7 Loading … Achive your Success with Latest ACAMS CAMS-FCI Exam: https://www.dumpleader.com/CAMS-FCI_exam.html --------------------------------------------------- Images: https://blog.dumpleader.com/wp-content/plugins/watu/loading.gif https://blog.dumpleader.com/wp-content/plugins/watu/loading.gif --------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------- Post date: 2023-10-16 12:19:52 Post date GMT: 2023-10-16 12:19:52 Post modified date: 2023-10-16 12:19:52 Post modified date GMT: 2023-10-16 12:19:52