The Ultimate ACAMS CAMS-FCI Dumps PDF Review [Q22-Q44]

NEW QUESTION 22
An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance.
KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank in 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.
* X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer;
* Y is the authorized signatory of this entity customer. This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.
KYC PROFILE
Customer Name: AAA International Company. Ltd
Customer ID: 123456
Account Opened: June 2017
Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020
Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017 AML risk level: High Account opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans and Trade Finance Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amount During the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul
2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:
TRANSACTION JOURNAL
Review dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021
For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:
Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from different third parties Outgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to different third parties For United States Dollars (USD) currency:
Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from different third parties Outgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to different third parties.
RFI Information and Supporting documents:
According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank with the information below:
1) All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank.
Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.
2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank’s customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay the loan Based on the KYC profile and the transaction journal, the pattern of activity shows a deviation in:

expected vs. actual activity.

customer risk rating

product risk rating.

U.S. currency incoming vs. outgoing transaction rales.

NEW QUESTION 23
An AML investigator at a bank identifies an unusually high number of deposits from a few customers resulting from the encashment of multiple gambling tickets from a legitimate gambling company. It is noted that the transactions are inconsistent with the customers’ profiles and that reverse (corrective) transactions did not occur. Which suspicious activity is most likely?

The winning tickets are traded to criminals who. in turn, use the customers’ accounts.

The gambling company created fictitious transactions in an attempt to misrepresent the size of its business activity.

The customers are attempting to evade income tax.

The customers deposited fake winning tickets.

NEW QUESTION 24
Which reputations risk consequence could a financial entity face for violating AML laws?

Loss of high-profile customers

Increased audit costs to monitor behavior

Seizure of assets

Monetary penalties

NEW QUESTION 25
Potentially suspicious activity following an increase in the volume of transactions by an import company included outgoing wires to Indonesia and Uganda referencing invoice numbers. Incoming funds included large cash deposits and checks/wires from pet stores, breeders, and private individuals. What financial crime might the bank reference in the SAR/STR?

Tax evasion scheme

International drug trafficking

Illegal wildlife trade

Black market peso exchange

NEW QUESTION 26
A compliance analyst is reviewing the account activity of a customer that they suspect may be indicative of money laundering activity. Which is difficult to determine solely from the customer’s account activity and KYC file?

If the activity is materially different from related businesses

If the account has multiple transfers to the same, related businesses

If there is negative media associated with counterparties

If the account is mostly dormant or has little activity

NEW QUESTION 27
During a review, an analyst notices discrepancies between a customer’s nature of business listed on the business registry and what was stated on the customers application. The analyst should:

clarify discrepancies noted in the customer’s declared profile given the downstream impact on the risk assessment.

close the review as there is no adverse news in the public domain.

review all documents for whether certified true copies are submitted.

accept discrepancies in the information given the onboarding team did not flag any issue.

NEW QUESTION 28
An investigator receives an alert documenting a series of transactions. A limited liability corporation (LLC) wired 59.000.000 USD to an overseas account associated with a state-run oil company. A second account associated with the state-run oil company wired 600,000,000 USD to the LLC. The LLC then wired money to other accounts, a money brokerage firm, and real estate purchases.
The investigator initiated an enhanced KYC investigation on the LLC. The financial institution opened the LLC account a couple weeks prior to the series of transactions. The names associated with the LLC had changed multiple times since the account opened. A search of those names revealed relations with multiple LLCs. Public records about the LLCs did not show any identifiable business activities.
Open-source research identified mixed reports about the brokerage firm. The firm indicated it purchased mutual funds for its clients and dispensed returns to clients. Media reports claimed the firm laundered money by holding money for a fee before returning it to investors.
What is the total suspicious transaction amount that the investigator should report?

600,000,000 USD

59,000,000 USD

541.000,000 USD

659,000,000 USD

NEW QUESTION 29
Which might suggest misuse of crowdfunding resources by a terrorist?

A small charge at a gas station followed by a large charge at an electronics store

A large deposit followed by multiple charges at a sporting goods store

Multiple small deposits followed by a wire transfer to a large well-known international charity

Multiple small deposits followed by the purchase of airplane tickets >

NEW QUESTION 30
An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance.
KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank in 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.
* X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer;
* Y is the authorized signatory of this entity customer. This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.
KYC PROFILE
Customer Name: AAA International Company. Ltd
Customer ID: 123456
Account Opened: June 2017
Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020
Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017 AML risk level: High Account opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans, and Trade Finance Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amount During the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul
2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:
TRANSACTION JOURNAL
Review dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021
For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:
Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from different third parties Outgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to different third parties For United States Dollars (USD) currency:
Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from different third parties Outgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to different third parties.
RFI Information and Supporting documents:
According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank with the information below:
1J All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank.
Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.
2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank’s customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay the loan Which additional information would support escalating this account for closure?

The bank files SARs/STRs indicating that Y opened accounts for small companies located in close proximity to the bank.

A follow-up request reveals that the account receives funds from loans, collects payments from group-related companies, and sends the payments to the lenders.

A review of outward remittances reveals the same pattern of several simple steps for each transaction,

A review of X’s personal bank account shows that X received wire transfers that aggregate the amounts transferred to the group-related companies.

NEW QUESTION 31
Law enforcement (LE) suspects human trafficking to occur during a major sporting event LE officers asked several financial institutions (FIs) to monitor financial transactions occurring before, during, and after the event.
An investigator identified a pattern linked to a business. The business’ account received multiple even dollar deposits between midnight and 4:00 AM. They occurred each day for several days prior to the date of the sporting event. Also, large cash deposits, typically between 2,000 USD and 3,000 USD. made by a person to the business’ account occurred in many branches in the days after the sports event.
There was little information about the company. The company did not have any history of employee payroll expenses or paying taxes. Expenses from the business account included air travel and hotel expenses. Searches about the person making cash deposits showed little. An online social media platform webpage with the individual’s name showed ads for dates1′ and “companionship.” The Fl wants to create an automated alert for human trafficking money laundering after this investigation.
Which activity type should they target?

Payments made to multiple hotels in the same city

Multiple deposits between midnight and 4:00 AM

Deposits made within days of major sporting events

Payments made for virtual currency

NEW QUESTION 32
A U.S. financial institution (Fl) receives a grand jury subpoena for a corporate client’s account. The Fl should:

request the client’s consent for the disclosure of account information.

review the corporate account’s activity and transactions.

file a SAR/STR.

provide the client with a copy of the subpoena.

NEW QUESTION 33
An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance.
KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank since 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.
* X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer;
* Y is is the authorized signatory of this entity customer. This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.
KYC PROFILE
Customer Name: AAA International Company. Ltd
Customer ID: 123456
Account Opened: June 2017
Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020
Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017 AML risk level: High Account opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans and Trade Finance Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amount During the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul
2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:
TRANSACTION JOURNAL
Review dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021
For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:
Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from different third parties Outgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to different third parties For United States Dollars (USD) currency:
Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from different third parties Outgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to different third parties.
RFI Information and Supporting documents:
According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank with the information below:
1) All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank.
Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.
2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank’s customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay the loan After reviewing the transaction journal, request for information response, and supporting documentation, the investigator determines that additional information is needed. Which additional information should the investigator request?

Previously filed SARVSTR unrelated to the customer, but similar in content

Formation document/description of the group-related companies

Source of the incoming funds to the group-related companies

Adverse news screening on all names listed in the formation documents

NEW QUESTION 34
Which action is part of the enhanced due diligence process?

Collecting beneficial ownership details regarding the client’s account

Using standard monitoring procedures to monitor transactions and account activity

Verifying the source of wealth for entities and natural person clients

Applying higher ownership percentage requirement for beneficial ownership collection

NEW QUESTION 35
During transaction monitoring. Bank A learns that one of its customers. Med Supplies 123, is attempting to make a payment via wire totaling 382.500 USD to PPE Business LLC located in Mexico to purchase a large order of personal protective equipment. specifically surgical masks and face shields. Upon further verification.
Bank A decides to escalate and refers the case to investigators.
Bank A notes that days prior to the above transaction, the same customer went to a Bank A location to wire
1,215,280 USD to Breath Well LTD located in Singapore. Breath Well was acting as an intermediary to purchase both 3-ply surgical masks and face shields from China. Bank A decided not to complete the transaction due to concerns with the involved supplier in China. Moreover, the customer is attempting to send a third wire in the amount of 350,000 USD for the purchase of these items, this time using a different vendor in China. The investigator must determine the next steps in the investigation and what actions, if any. should be taken against relevant parties.
The investigator is gathering more information to determine if a SAR/STR filing is needed. Which steps are the correct ways of collecting the additional information? (Select Two.)

Reach out to the relationship manager asking if more up-to-date customer due diligence information can be collected on the customer.

Use available documentation received from law enforcement (e.g.. grand jury subpoena) as red flags in SAR/STR filing.

Reach out to the customer and ask for supporting documentation for the conducted wires to avoid SAR/STR filing.

Conduct open-source research to determine if the customer and involved counterparties are in the same business field.

Issue a USA PATRIOT ACT Section 314(b) request to participating financial institutions advising that information is needed to decide if the activity is suspicious.

NEW QUESTION 36
A financial institution (Fl) banks a money transmitter business (MTB) located in Miami. The MTB regularly initiates wire transfers with the ultimate beneficiary in Cuba and legally sells travel packages to Cuba. The wire transfers for money remittances comply with the country’s economic sanctions policies. A Fl investigator on the sanctions team reviews each wire transfer to ensure compliance with sanctions and to monitor transfer details.
An airline located in Cuba, unrelated to the business, legally sells airline tickets in Cuba to Cuban citizens wanting to travel outside of Cuba. The airline tickets are purchased using Cuban currency (CUC).
The MTB wants 100,000 USD worth of CUC. Purchasing CUC from a Cuban bank includes a 4% fee. The MTB contacts the airline to ask if the airline will trade its CUC for USD at a lower exchange fee than the Cuban bank. The airline agrees to a 1% fee. The MTB initiates a wire transfer to the airline which appears as normal activity in the monitoring system because of the business’ travel package sales.
Which investigative actions should the investigator take concerning the 100.000 USD wire transfer? (Select Three.)

Review the wire transfer protocols for this customer.

Gather all account activity for Fl clients that purchased packages from the airline.

Review a sampling of wire transfers initiated by travel companies with Cuba travel packages.

Recommend a plan for the Fl’s management to restrict the account relationship.

Review regulations applicable to foreign currency trading transactions.

Locate and review licenses, registrations, and account operating agreements associated with the MTB account.

NEW QUESTION 37
The investigative department of a financial institution (Fl) receives an internal escalation notice from the remittance department for a SWIFT message requesting a refund due to potential fraud. The notice indicates that a total of three international incoming remittances were transferred to a corporate customer from Country A, in the amount of approximately 5 million EUR for each. The first two incoming remittances had been exchanged into currency B and transferred out to Country B a few days ago. The third incoming remittance has been held by the remittance department.
As noted from the KYC profile, the corporate customer is working in the wood industry. with the last account review completed 3 months ago. Since the account’s opening. there has been no history of a large amount of funds flowing through the account. The investigator conducts an Internet search and finds that the remitter is a food beverage company.
The same morning, the investigator receives a call from a financial intelligence unit (FIU) inquiring about the same incident. The FIU states that it will issue a warrant to freeze the account on the same day.
Which steps for documenting the final investigation decision are appropriate for the investigator in this scenario?

Exclude any open-source information from record-keeping since it is publicly available.

Add all of the information the Fl has about the subject, their account(s) activity, research results. KYC information, etc. to the SAR/STR.

Document the investigation process and retain all relevant documents in the case management system.

Do not document the investigation process if a SAR/STR is not filed.

NEW QUESTION 38
The investigative department of a financial institution (Fl) receives an internal escalation notice from the remittance department for a SWIFT message requesting a refund due to potential fraud. The notice indicates that a total of three international incoming remittances were transferred to a corporate customer from Country A, in the amount of approximately 5 million EUR for each. The first two incoming remittances had been exchanged into currency B and transferred out to Country B a few days ago. The third incoming remittance has been held by the remittance department.
As noted from the KYC profile, the corporate customer is working in the wood industry. with the last account review completed 3 months ago. Since the account’s opening. there has been no history of a large amount of funds flowing through the account. The investigator conducts an Internet search and finds that the remitter is a food beverage company.
The same morning, the investigator receives a call from a financial intelligence unit (FIU) inquiring about the same incident. The FIU states that it will issue a warrant to freeze the account on the same day.
After further review, the decision is made that transactions appear suspicious. Which are the next steps the investigator should take? (Select Two.)

Close the customer’s accounts since the FIU is issuing a warrant to freeze the funds.

Contact local LE and advise them of the investigation details to help speed up the investigation and prosecution.

Provide additional information to the LE upon receiving a formal request.

Close the investigation as the FIU is already on this matter, and they will inform LE if needed.

Gather all the information that would be useful for law enforcement (LE) and recommend filing a SAR/STR

NEW QUESTION 39
SAR/STR NARRATIVE
A SAR/STR has been submitted on five transactions conducted on the correspondent banking relationship with ABC Bank.
Client Information:
Remitter information: DEF Oil Resource Ltd. is the oldest member of the DEF Group. It was founded in 1977 as a general trading business with a primary focus on exports from Africa and North America. The group has business activities that span the entire energy value chain. Their core field of endeavor is centered within the oil and gas industry and its associated sub-sectors.
Beneficiary Information:
As per the response received from ABC Bank, it was determined that the beneficiaries are related to DEF Oil Resource Ltd. These were created by DEF Oil Resource Ltd. to purchase property in a foreign country on behalf of their senior management as part of a bonus scheme. The purpose behind this payment was for purchase of property in another country.
Payment Reference:
ABCXXXXX31PZFG2H
ABCXXXXXX51PQGEH
ABCXXXXXX214QWVG
ABCXXXXXX41PSXA2
ABCXXXXXX815QWS3
Concerns:
* We are unsure about the country of incorporation of the beneficiaries.
* We are concerned about the transactional activity since the payment made towards entities (conducted on behalf of individuals) appears to be possible tax evasion.
* There appears to be an attempt to conceal the identity of individuals (senior management), which again raises concerns about the source of funds.
* Referring to the response received from ABC Bank, we are unclear about the ultimate beneficiary of funds.
* The remitter is involved in a high-risk business, (i.e., oil and crude products trading), and the beneficiary is involved in a real estate business which again poses a higher risk.
The monitoring system of the correspondent institution flags the transaction as suspicious activity. The correspondent bank needs to send a request for information to the respondent bank. Which elements should be included in the request? (Select Three.)

Details of DEF Oil Resource Ltd parent company and the name(s) of the beneficial owner(s)

Full transaction history of the correspondent bank’s customer

The account profile of the customer and their KYC data

The respondent bank’s customer’s senior management bonus plan

The contract pertaining to the purchase of property in another country

The last 6 months of transactional history

NEW QUESTION 40
A financial institution <FI> might use which option as intelligence to file a SAR/STR?

A customer makes several deposits in one month that appear to exceed their expected monthly income.

A customer receives a large, one-time wire from a law firm.

The Fl is unable to obtain evidence of required licensing or registration despite suspicion of money transmitting.

The Fl discovers a large number of securities transactions that appear to be related to day trading.

NEW QUESTION 41
Sanctions screening requirements include that a financial institution should:

report an individual whose name appears on a sanctions list to the police.

immediately freeze the bank account of an individual that appears on a sanctions list.

compare customer and transaction records against periodically updated sanctions lists provided by governmental bodies.

immediately close the bank account of an entity who appears on a sanctions list.

NEW QUESTION 42
A financial institution (Fl) has considered the available relevant factors in a transaction and has determined it will file a SAR^STR. Which is needed to support the contents of the report to the financial intelligence unit?

Definitive proof that suspicious activity occurred

Enough circumstantial evidence about the suspicious activity for a criminal proceeding

No factual description of the suspicious activity

Low evidentiary threshold about the suspicious activity

NEW QUESTION 43
An investigator is reviewing an alert for unusual activity. System scanning detected a text string within a company customer’s account transactions that indicates the account may have been used for a drug or drug paraphernalia purchase Based on the KYC profile, the investigator determines the customer’s company name and business type are marketed as a gardening supplies company. The investigator reviews the account activity and notes an online purchase transaction that leads the investigator to a website that sells various strains of marijuana. Additional account review detects cash deposits into the account at the branch teller lines, so the investigator reaches out to the teller staff regarding the transactions. The teller staff member reports that the business customers have frequently deposited cash in lower amounts. The teller, without prompting, adds that one of the transactors would occasionally smell of a distinct scent of marijuana smoke.
Which are the best next steps for the investigator to take? (Select Three.)

Review the customer’s transaction history.

Request information from the internet service provider who hosts the website.

Check internal KYC information.

Research other customer accounts for transactions to the same website.
E Conduct adverse media and open-source searches on the customer’s background.

Identify if the customer has opened accounts in an urban city area.

Explanation
The best next steps for the investigator to take are:
A: Review the customer’s transaction history. This can help the investigator identify any patterns or anomalies in the customer’s account activity, such as changes in transaction volume, frequency, amount, source, destination, purpose, etc. The investigator can also compare the customer’s transaction history with their KYC profile and risk rating to assess if there are any discrepancies or inconsistencies.
C: Check internal KYC information. This can help the investigator verify the customer’s identity, business nature, ownership structure, expected activity, source of funds, etc. The investigator can also update or enhance the customer’s KYC information based on any new or relevant information obtained from other sources.
E:Conduct adverse media and open-source searches on the customer’s background. This can help the investigator find out if there is any negative or adverse information about the customer in public data sources, such as news articles, social media posts, blogs, forums, etc. Adverse media and open-source searches can also provide additional context and insight into the customer’s reputation, behavior, associations, etc. The other options are incorrect because:
B: Request information from the internet service provider who hosts the website is not feasible, as it may require a legal process or a court order to obtain such information. Moreover, the internet service provider may not have or disclose any useful information about the website or its owner.
D: Research other customer accounts for transactions to the same website is not relevant, as it may not provide any meaningful information about the customer under investigation. Furthermore, it may violate the privacy and confidentiality of other customers who are not related to the investigation.
F: Identify if the customer has opened accounts in an urban city area is not helpful, as it may not have any bearing on the customer’s involvement in a drug or drug paraphernalia purchase. Additionally, it may not be possible to access or verify such information without the customer’s consent or authorization.
References:
Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification | ACAMS, Section 2: Investigating Financial Crimes, page 11 Leading Complex Investigations Certificate | ACAMS, Module 3: Conducting Research and Analysis, page 6 Adverse Media Screening – Using AI to Mitigate Risk Legal requirements for adverse media screening – Thomson Reuters Electronic client due diligence | Ethics helpsheets | ICAEW
6AMLD & FATF: Where Adverse Media Screening Fits In
Free Adverse Media Check | NameScan

NEW QUESTION 44
A SAR/STR regarding money-mule activity prompts law enforcement action. Under U.S. law, the alleged money mules can be prosecuted:

only if they were aware of their role and actively participated.

in a country only if funds were transferred between accounts maintained in the same country.

unless they can prove they were not aware of the origin of the funds.

even if they were unaware that money was transferred.